Case Corner – Roosevelt Travis, Jr. v. Acme Barricades L.C., et al.

October 9, 2026
Case Corner

Jurisdiction: Circuit Court, Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Gadsden County, Florida
Case No.: 23-CA-275
Date: November 19, 2025
Judge: David Frank

Roosevelt Travis, Jr. v. Acme Barricades L.C., et al.

Past Medical Bills, Directed Verdicts, and Why the Jury Gets to Decide More Than Defendants Often Want

A recent Gadsden County order offers a useful reminder for Florida personal injury litigation: once a plaintiff connects medical bills to treatment for accident-related injuries through testimony and records, the question of whether those bills are reasonable and necessary is often one for the jury, not the judge. In Roosevelt Travis, Jr. v. Acme Barricades L.C., et al., the court revisited its own post-verdict ruling, acknowledged it had gone too far in taking past medical expenses away from the jury, restored that portion of the award, and denied the defense request for a new trial.

For lawyers, adjusters, and anyone following Florida tort litigation, the order is important because it addresses four recurring trial issues at once:

proof of past medical expenses,
whether medical bills improperly influence a verdict,
whether an expert’s “discovery deposition” can be used at trial, and
how preservation rules can defeat post-trial complaints about jury selection and stray comments during voir dire.

What the Court Originally Did

At trial, the defense moved for a directed verdict on the plaintiff’s claim for past medical expenses. The argument centered on whether the plaintiff had provided enough proof that the medical charges were reasonable and necessary. The court initially allowed the issue to go to the jury, the medical bills were admitted, and the jury considered them. But after the verdict came back, the court granted the reserved motion and subtracted the past medical expenses from the verdict.

That did not stand. On reconsideration, the court concluded its first ruling was the correct one and that the plaintiff had in fact presented enough evidence to let the jury decide the issue.

Why the Court Restored the Past Medical Expenses

The order leaned heavily on recent Florida authority explaining that a plaintiff does not necessarily have to produce separate testimony proving each dollar amount charged was independently “reasonable” in the abstract. Instead, the plaintiff must present evidence that:

the bills were incurred,
the treatment was necessary, and
the expenses were reasonably related to the injuries from the incident.

That distinction mattered here. The plaintiff introduced the medical bills and tied them to the treatment provided by medical professionals who testified about the relevant injuries. Combined with the plaintiff’s testimony, that was enough to create a jury question.

In other words, once the plaintiff cleared that threshold, the defense remained free to cross examine, challenge necessity, dispute causation, and argue the bills should be discounted or rejected. But the defense was not entitled to have the court remove the issue from the jury entirely.

That reasoning fits with the broader principle seen in other Florida injury cases: factual disputes over damages usually belong to the factfinder. It also lines up with the kind of issues discussed in Boltz Legal’s article on the Florida personal injury statute of limitations, where timing and proof can shape whether a claim even reaches a jury in the first place.

The Defense’s New Trial Argument Failed

The defense argued that if the jury saw large medical bills, those figures could have improperly influenced the jury’s view of pain and suffering and other damages. But once the court determined the medical bills were properly admitted in the first place, that theory lost its footing. If the evidence was properly before the jury, then the jury’s exposure to that evidence was not unfair prejudice.

The court also emphasized the high standard for setting aside a jury verdict. Florida courts repeatedly remind trial judges that a jury’s decision should not be lightly disturbed. A judge cannot simply act as a “super-juror” because the judge might have reached a different result. That theme comes up again and again in litigation whether the dispute involves personal injury, premises liability, or other negligence claims like those discussed in Open and Obvious Sidewalk Condition Bars Trip-and-Fall Claim and Gwen Ortega v. JW Marriott Investment, LLC: Premises Liability and the Open and Obvious Doctrine.

No “Trial Deposition” Was Required

Another defense argument was that the plaintiff should not have been allowed to use an expert’s deposition at trial unless it was a specially designated second deposition taken solely for trial purposes. The court rejected that argument outright.

Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.330 and 1.390 allow expert depositions to be used at trial. The rules do not require a second, separately labeled “trial deposition.” Lawyers often do take second depositions to streamline presentation, but the rules do not make that a condition of admissibility. In practical terms, the order recognizes what trial lawyers across Florida already know: the same expert deposition often serves both discovery and trial functions.

That is an important procedural point because defendants sometimes try to recast ordinary expert deposition use as unfair surprise. This order makes clear that such an objection has no traction when the rules themselves authorize the use.

The Melbourne Complaint Was Not Preserved

The defense also challenged a peremptory strike, arguing after the fact that plaintiff’s counsel did not accurately recount a juror’s answers during the Melbourne race neutral explanation process. The court rejected that argument because the defense did not object on that specific basis during the colloquy itself.

That ruling is a classic preservation lesson. If trial counsel believes an opponent’s factual characterization is wrong during jury selection, counsel has to say so then and there. Silence at the moment usually means waiver later. The same common sense lesson appears in appellate and sanctions related disputes too: courts expect lawyers to raise problems when they happen, not after the verdict. That theme also makes Boltz Legal’s article on AI Fake Citations: Morgan & Morgan Sanctioned especially relevant in today’s litigation environment, where precision and preservation matter more than ever.

A Brief Insurance Comment During Voir Dire Was Not Enough

Finally, the defense argued that a prospective juror’s short unsolicited comment about rising insurance rates unfairly prejudiced the defendants. The court was not persuaded. The statement was not provoked by plaintiff’s counsel, was brief, and did not involve any meaningful discussion about whether the defendant had liability coverage, what it covered, or how much it might pay. The court concluded the issue was handled appropriately and did not justify a new trial.

Why This Order Matters

This case is a good example of how trial courts sometimes revisit a reserved ruling after examining the law more carefully. More importantly, it shows how often post trial motions fail when the jury was simply asked to decide a disputed factual issue it had every right to decide.

The defense had opportunities to challenge the plaintiff’s medical proof through cross examination, counter proof, and closing argument. The jury heard the evidence and made its call. Once the court recognized that the bills were properly before the jury, the rest of the defense’s “tainted verdict” argument largely collapsed.

For plaintiffs, the lesson is clear: build a clean evidentiary chain between the treatment, the providers, the injuries, and the bills. For defendants, the lesson is equally clear: if you want a directed verdict, you need more than disagreement with the plaintiff’s damages proof you need a genuine legal deficiency.

This order also fits within the larger pattern of Florida courts drawing lines between issues for the judge and issues for the jury. When the plaintiff has laid a sufficient foundation, reasonableness and necessity are usually classic fact questions.

Final Takeaway

The court restored the jury’s past medical expense award and denied the defense motion for new trial because:

the plaintiff introduced the bills into evidence,
the bills were tied to treatment and injuries through testimony,
the defense’s expert deposition argument lacked legal support,
the jury selection complaint was not preserved, and
the brief insurance related comment during voir dire did not create unfair prejudice.

It is a straightforward but important ruling: if the plaintiff lays enough foundation, the jury not the court gets to decide the value and legitimacy of past medical expenses.

Today’s Insight

“It is not wisdom but authority that makes a law.”

— Thomas Hobbes

ROOSEV~1 Download