Jurisdiction: Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
Case No.: 4D2025-0959
Lower Tribunal Case No.: CACE25002752
Date: December 17, 2025
Lower Court: Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Judge Jeffrey Levenson
Case Summary: Mistivar v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office
This case is a clean procedural reminder that Florida’s “vexatious litigant” statute limits future pro se filings but does not automatically authorize dismissal of a lawsuit that’s already pending.
Alex Mistivar (pro se) sued the Broward County Sheriff’s Office and others. The defendants moved to have him declared a vexatious litigant under section 68.093(4), Florida Statutes (2024) and asked the court to dismiss the case, or alternatively require him to post security under section 68.093(3).
The trial court very quickly entered an order:
- declaring Mistivar a vexatious litigant,
- dismissing his pending case, and
- prohibiting him from filing future pro se cases in the circuit without administrative judge permission.
On appeal, the Fourth DCA held:
- The vexatious litigant designation was proper (affirmed), but
- Dismissal of the pending action was not authorized by section 68.093(4) (reversed), so the case must be reinstated and proceed.
Key Procedural Timeline
- Defendants filed a motion to declare Mistivar vexatious and dismiss (or require security).
- Mistivar filed an opposition response the same day.
- The trial court entered the dismissal order about nine minutes after the response.
- Mistivar moved to vacate/reopen; after a hearing the next week, the court denied those motions and kept the case dismissed.
- The Fourth DCA reversed the dismissal portion.
The Legal Issues and Holdings
1) Can section 68.093(4) be used to dismiss a pending case?
Holding: No.
The court emphasized the statute’s plain language: it authorizes prohibiting a vexatious litigant from commencing new pro se actions without prior leave. It does not authorize dismissing an already-filed, pending lawsuit.
The court relied on the logic of earlier authority (including a First DCA case) holding that a designation under 68.093(4) restricts future filings, not retroactive dismissal of an existing case.
Result: dismissal reversed; remand for further proceedings.
2) Was the vexatious litigant designation itself proper?
Holding: Yes.
Defendants showed Mistivar filed six civil cases in that circuit within the prior five years, each decided adversely to him meeting the statutory threshold.
Result: designation affirmed.
3) Was a hearing required before declaring him vexatious under 68.093(4)?
Holding: Not required for the designation under (4).
The court clarified what the defendants cited: the case they relied on stands for the point that the court can make the (4) designation without a hearing. A hearing becomes required when a defendant seeks security under 68.093(3).
So, the trial court didn’t have to hold a hearing to label him vexatious but it still couldn’t dismiss the pending case under (4).
Practical Takeaways
- Section 68.093(4) = forward looking gatekeeping.
It’s a “permission slip” requirement for future pro se filings, not a dismissal weapon for cases already on file. - Security is different.
If the defense wants the court to require a vexatious litigant to post security under 68.093(3), that’s when hearing requirements matter more. - You can win the label but still lose the dismissal.
That’s exactly what happened: designation affirmed, dismissal reversed. - Procedural precision matters.
Even if the plaintiff fits the statute’s definition, remedies must match the statute’s text.
Today’s Insight
“The first duty of society is justice.”
— Alexander Hamilton