Case Summary: Kapson v. Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty Insurance Co.
Jurisdiction: Florida Third District Court of Appeal
Case No.: 3D24-0363
Lower Tribunal Case No.: 18-CA-1089-K
Date: January 14, 2026
Lower Court: Circuit Court for Monroe County, Judge Mark Wilson
This decision addresses a recurring post-hurricane litigation issue in Florida homeowners insurance cases: whether evidence of flood insurance payments may be admitted in a wind only (named-peril) coverage dispute and whether such evidence violates Florida’s collateral source rule or section 90.408.
After Hurricane Irma destroyed their home, Danny Kapson and Rose Noelle pursued coverage under multiple policies, including:
- a flood policy, and
- a named peril homeowners policy covering wind damage issued by Homeowners Choice.
The insureds collected $222,800 from their flood insurer without dispute. Homeowners Choice acknowledged some covered wind damage and paid $38,122.67 for roof and truss damage, but denied coverage for the remainder of the loss, asserting it was caused by flooding and storm surge, excluded perils under the policy’s anti-concurrent causation language.
The insureds sued, advancing an all or-nothing theory: that wind destroyed the home before any flooding occurred, rendering all damage covered.
The jury rejected that theory and returned a verdict for the insurer. The Third DCA affirmed.
Key Legal Issues and Holdings
1. Admission of Flood Insurance Evidence
Holding: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that the insureds made a flood claim and received flood benefits.
In a named peril policy case, evidence that the insured sought and obtained benefits for a peril expressly excluded under the disputed policy is relevant to causation, not damages.
Here, the evidence directly rebutted the insureds’ contention that wind alone caused the total loss. The jury was entitled to consider whether flood, rather than wind, caused the destruction.
Importantly, the amount of the flood payment was excluded only the fact of the flood claim and receipt of benefits was admitted.
2. Section 90.408 (Settlement or Compromise)
Holding: Section 90.408 did not bar the evidence.
The flood payment was not a settlement or compromise of a disputed claim. The record showed the flood carrier simply fulfilled its contractual obligation without dispute as to validity or amount.
Section 90.408 applies only where there is a compromise of a disputed claim. Routine insurance payments made without dispute do not qualify as settlements under the statute.
Additionally, the evidence was admitted to prove causation, not liability or value an independently permissible purpose under section 90.408.
3. Collateral Source Rule
Holding: The collateral source evidentiary rule did not bar admission of the flood claim evidence.
Florida law allows evidence of collateral source payments when:
- the evidence is relevant to liability or causation, or
- it rebuts a party’s theory of the case.
Here, the insureds’ theory that wind destroyed the home before flooding made evidence of flood insurance recovery highly probative. The evidence corrected a potentially misleading presentation of causation.
Once again, the jury did not hear the dollar amount of the flood payment, minimizing any risk of prejudice.
Practical Takeaways
- Named-peril cases are about causation, not sympathy.
When coverage depends on a single peril (like wind), insurers may introduce evidence of other claims to show excluded causes. - Flood payments ≠ settlement evidence.
Routine insurance payments do not automatically invoke section 90.408. - Collateral source is not absolute.
It does not shield insureds from relevant evidence when causation is disputed. - All-or-nothing strategies carry risk.
When insureds argue total destruction from a covered peril, prior claims for excluded perils become fair game.
Today’s Insight
“Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored.”
Aldous Huxley